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ln 2010 a group of Russian experts and officials under the guidance of 19or Yurg巴ns，the director of the lnstitute of 
Contemporary Dev巴lopment(Russia) presented the program“The Modernization of Russia as the Construction of a 
New State 1 )". The modernization itself is un-derstood as the set of activities aimed at closing the gap between Russia 
組 dindustrial coun-tries. Seeking the ways to overcome what they cal “the econornic and technological backwardness" 
of Russia， th巴authorsinsist on choosing the optimal“modernization pattern"， a model which shall form the criterial 
叩 dthe evaluation basis of this program. 
Thus， the independent expert report prepared by the heads of relevant subcommittees of the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation together with the leaders of the National Strategy lnstitute 、10d巴rnizationof Russia as the con-
struction of a new state" 
The very necessity of such a comp紅ativemodel as well as of its public recognition is not disputed.百lemoderniza-
tion itself usually happens in those countries and socio-巴conomicsys-tems that紅eaware of their backlog from the 
more developed countries， and at a particular point recognize the necessity of deeper institutional reforms for overcom-
ing， orat least significantly reducing of this backlog. Researchers define the modernization as a process of transition of 
a countηfrom the present conditions to desired， where the later shall provide its successfull and smooth development 
in the present world 2) • Others treat it as a“politically biased development project that uses an effective institutional 
reforms to address the pressing problems of development in the cash-specific socio-historical conditions 3) ." lt seems 
to us that to correctly understand the essence of the unfolding process of the revitalization efforts to modernize Russia， 
it is important to answer the question:“Does the desire to upgrade the cu町entconditions suppose the continuation of 
the process of fundamental renewal， which went during the past twenty years under the motto of market reforms， orthis 
desire supposes the intention to change the veηvector of econornic development and to ch岨 gethe very pattern of 
modernization" . 
This issue is important due to the fact that血esuccessful modernization cannot be merely a campaign or a certain set 
of formal events; it must serve the result of intrinsic changes in society. The world experience of the past few centuries 
shows that modernization policies are ineffective without the relevant institutional changes; th巴sepolicies require a per 
suasive ideological support， the improvement of the basis of social reforms and the strong motivation to upgradeon 
behalf of the majority of econornic agents. 
The proc加nationof modernization of the Russian economy happened 20 years after the start of the dismantling of 
planned economy methods in favor of management based upon market economy principles. Certain results were 
achieved after a long time， how巴vertheir evaluation， though not conclusively， ranges from “good" to“unsatisfactory. " 
The very decision to develop a modernization program the Russian economy has only been taken now， while ten years 
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earlier it has been already noticed that the domestic economy was lagging behind most industrial countries 4) • 
So if the modemization of the national economy is treated as a panacea to overcome the backwardness of Russia 
from the West， then why didn't it start just after it was discover巴d?It' s true that during the last dozen years the gap 
with the industrially developed countries on some indicators has just only increased. AIso there' s no proof that the pro-
posed modemization pattem is bas巴dupon the critical review of the fundamental e町orsof the previous pr，吋ectsthat 
would prevent from repeating th巴min future. Thus a certain risk exists出atvast amounts of resources shall be spent 
unnecessarily， thus bringing to even worse results when this gap shall eventually widen. To組 swerthese important 
questions need it could be useful to review the world experience of modemization policies， the progress of their imple-
mentation， bringing the results of such retrospective analysis to the evaluation of the basic options which exist for 
Russia today. This analysis shall not be locked within the circle of merely technological or adrninistrative changes; 
these institutional changes must be examined within the overall diverse context of the relevant political， social， cultural 
and historical conditions. The present paper analyzes two different historical modemization pattems which varying in 
the terms of the elaboration and the depth of institutional transformations and as a result， brought disparate results. 
These are France of出e17 -th and J apan at the outcome of the 19th-century. 
It was noticed that“historically th巴m吋orityof modemizations followed the catch-up pattem 5) .". The first experi-
ence of such a“catch-up" modemization of the national economy seems to be found in Colbertism， carried out by J.-
B. Colbert in France. By his time， inthe 17-出 centurysome representatives of the new generation of French bureau-
crats (and among them Colbert himself)， come to the understanding of the backlog of France from Britain and 
Holland which were showing the best performance at that time. In his co汀espondencewith King Louis XIV of France 
Colbert points at this lagging of the industry and commerce of France， especially from Holland. Colbert considered it to 
be a significant reason for the ineffectual state of French economy 6) • In this Iight the whole doctrine of Colbert may be 
seen as an attempt to give a qualitativ巴boostto the backward feudal socio-economic system of France using its 
absolute monarchy， asa guarantor of implementation of his projects. 
In a broader sense Colbertism often treated as the French version of mercantilism， an econornic policy doctrine com・
mon to most European powers which used it to a larger or lesser extent 7) • 
J. Mevre and some other researchers insist that Colbertism had nothing originally French inside，叩dthere' s nothing 
that may highlight it on the background of general trends of the European mercantilism. On the contrary， P.Leon and 
some others emphasize the originality of Colbertism， especially in comparison with English and Dutch forms of mer也
cantilism. However many disputing parties escapes the fact that above the material enrichment of the kingdom Colbert 
pursued the idea of bringing the productive capacity of national economy to the level already achieved in England and 
the Netherlands， keeping in mind the institutional issues of national economy as well. The idea of modernization of the 
monarchy itself is also seen behind certain proposals of Colbert. 
In the second half of XVII century， which accounts for the activities of Colbert， the poli-tical system of France has 
reached a stage of‘classical' absolute monarchy as叩 institutionwhere a monarch wielding an unrestricted political 
power over both nobility and bourgeoisie maintains an institutional balance between them making impossible for both 
of them to take ful political power8) : For nobility it was already， and for the new bourgeoisie it was not yet pos-sible. 
In these circumstances， both c1asses considered the presence of strong royal authority as a definite assurance that none 
of them will increase its power so that it could infringe the interests of another. Per se， the institution of absolute 
monarchy in this model was stable allowing the prerequisites of progress necessary for survival further development of 
the state economy. 
Thus， inColbert's eyes to modemize the absolute monarchy" and “to modemize national economy" was identical. 
In his understanding the economic development of France could not be isolated from the development of the absolute 
monarchy as an institution， and， consequently， economic changes would be ineffective without institutional changes. 
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It seems that certain elements of his program Colbert has formulated before his appointment to the highest economic 
official position 9 I • In particular， his ideas about radical changes in the existing巴conomicsystem were formulated long 
before Colbert obtained a real power. Normalization of finance and credit was the starting point of his reform while the 
changes in the socio-economic system were its final point. Looking at his financial reforms we may trace the desire of 
Colbert to r巴lyupon the experience and practice of Netherlands， one of the most advanced nations at that time in finan-
cial aspects. So instead of “reinventing the wheel" Colbert simply proposes to transfer the achievements of a leading 
economy to his local national basis. At a time when he was asked to manage the affairs of Cardinal Mazぽin，Colb巴此
closely watched the interest rates in the Netherlands. When in France they were much higher th加 inNetherlands， 
Colbert consider巴dthe domestic level as inadequate， thus understanding the significance of monetary indicators for the 
industrial production. 
A common approach to the economic history of Europe says that England was the first na-tion to industrialize. It 
took place there after 1750， first in a less capital-intensive and con-sumer-oriented industry (cotton). From that time 
on the n巴wtechnologies werl巴 introduced，ac-companied with the organization changes and increase of the scale of 
industrial production， as well as with dramatic social consequences. In particular， the female wage-eぽningactivities 
increased10l • Industrial revolution， as this transformation was called later， was a spontaneous process， driven by an 
“invisible hand" . 
However， ifone looks a century back， one may notice the entire shift that occurred in France between th巴twopoints， 
“before"加 d“after"Colbert， has the same trend: growth of industry， intensification of the usage of the aggregate 
workforce potential of the nation and， asa by-effect， the known extent of crisis in agricultural sector. In a certain way 
Colbertism was an industrialization pattem relying upon specific political environment， technological basis and chal-
lenges from the outside world. 
Colbert saw the development of manufacturing as an opportunity to absorb the achievements of叩 advancedforeign 
industry (primarily English) thus providing the basis for the upgrade of the whole national economy. Colbert saw 
the advantages of manufactures more in the qualitative sense (production of new goods) ，rather that in quantitative 
(manufactures provided the larger scope of production) . Meanwhile Colbert kept the guilds as an institution of tradト
tional， industrial mass production. The prerequisites for the competition betw巴enth巴semanufactures and guilds were 
objective and the losses in this struggle were unavoidable. 
On the one hand， manufactures constantly experienced labor shortages and had to divert a lot of funds for workers' 
training. Some of manufacturers were forced to organize the rigid op-eration mode when the employees were not 
allowed to go to the city; they lived in the industrial premises， they were fed and even listened the Mass ther巴.Later the 
elements of such institution reappeared and were later reshaped as the well-known practice of lifetime employment 
used in Japan. On the other hand， manufacturers were in a constant conflict with guilds since the later were a privi-
leged institution， free from the shop inspection. Ultimately， having not provided th巴radicalinstitutional changes in 
French industtγ， Colbert also could not achieve his main goal， that is to overcome the technological gap of France with 
more advanced economies. 
Since the trade policy of Colbert was inherently protectionist， itwas unable by itself to en-sure the necessary devel-
opment of French economy. It stuck in a competition between the manufactures and guilds. At the same time the most 
significant change， conceived by Colbert， did not find understanding. We mean the radical reshaping of social 班 uc旬re
which was a prerequisite of the modemization of the巴ntireeconomy of Franc巴.Her巴th巴viewsof Colbert were relying 
upon his understanding of the role of productive labor in the French economy. The large amount of workforce engaged 
in sectors that did not produce material goods s巴riouslyimpeded the task to r巴ducethe backlog with England and 
Holland. Among the things Colbert considered to be necessary for changing of the whole national institutional environ-
ment were: elirnination of selling public offices， a large-scale reform of the justice of the judicial apparatus and finance， 
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aimed to substantial reduction of people employed herell1 ， drastically reduction of the number of monks in monaster-
ies. Releasing this unproductively used labor， could have provided more sfaff for factories， becoming a pivot point in 
the competition between manufactures and guilds. lt could ensure an accelerated development of industηby the means 
of provided much-needed resources for the wide-scope modemization. 
In many respects proposals of Colbert may be caIled revolutionary for his time. On his be-half， the king considered 
them to be so dramatic that he did not decide on such a m吋orre-structuring of the social structure of France. Were his 
proposals of institutional restructuring adopted， the national modemization could have been more successful. Thus， the 
whole Col-bert' s modemization doctrine failed， for the old order showed itself incompatible with the radicaI institu-
tionaI changes. 
In the 21st century the essential foundation of Colbert' s approach find a certain response and understanding in 
Europe. The巴l巴m巴ntsof Colbert' s dirigist approach have found new ground within the Neo-Colbertist theories deveト
oped in Italy and Francel21 • The proponents of Neo-Colbertism stand for economic nationalism， they believe that the 
guid但nceof modemization processes requires the states and their national economies to resist globalization. One of the 
reasons for that was the fear of social destabilization， which could occur in the “old industrial countries" due to the 
transfer of production into the countries with lower labor costs. 
Until the mid-1980s， most senior civil servants resented the Commission's intervention in economic matters: They 
often equated EC economic legislation with anti-national activitism. But since the early 1990s， the once all-powerful 
national economic institutions such as minis-tries of economy and finance， budget， industry have more widely accepted 
a realistic view of the limits of their own policy abilities. They welcome the Community' s decisions within the Single 
European Act (SEAl31) as a way to disengage the state from dying industries， toabandon its financial commitment to 
the lame-duck companies and to force politically unpopular decisions on workers unions. 
Neo-realist scholars such as Andrew Moravcsik have shown how this“su町ender"to Community， which apparently 
weakens member states， infact serves their needs， asit gener-ates desired outcomes without the associated political 
costs. For Moravcsik， the nation-state adjusts to new external constraints without abandoning its ess巴ntial
prerogatives141 • Vivien Schmidt reaches the sam巴conclusion:“Thestate's colonization of business …means that there 
remains a single interpenetrating elite setting the course of the French economy. As a result， the retreat of the state has 
not brought the end of state influence over business， only a different， and more modem kind that mirrors the modem-
ization and intemationalization of French business itselfl51 ." The following table summarizes the transitional changes 
between traditional Colbertism and neo-Colbertism: 
Table 1. From Traditional Colbertism to Neo・Colbertism
Traditional Colbertism 
Historical Period Until the early 1980s 
Financing Procedures From public banking sector 
Modus operandi State int巴rventlOn
Role of French State Defines nationallegislation 
Guiding Principle Serves public 
Role of Business Followed goverrunent 
Neo・ColbertistModel 
After the SEA 
From stock exchange and intemational markets 
Market rules 
Only one player among 15 
“An ever closer Union" 
Initiatesneads 
The global crisis aIso has an impact upon this school of economic thought. Among the key紅easof modemization 
Neo・Colbertistssee the development of system of which shall op-pose global crises through the creation of new nation-
al institutions， such as public investment comp叩 ieswhich may exercise control over national comp姐 ies，like GIC 
(TheGovemm巴ntof Singapore Investment CorporationI61). 
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A different situation occuπed in Jap加， which had implemented modemizations not once， always ensuring success. 
The first experience of such a grand project that took place at the end of 19th -early 20th century (Meiji Period) . ltis 
notable as the earliest implementation of a catch-up strategy in a nation-wide scale. lt encompassed al social strata of 
the nation， with the key role of th巴stateand big business. The political regime， the monarchy did not interfere with the 
changes; on the contrary， itactively supported and faci!itated them. It proved the possibility to perform the upgrade 
within the existing political system， provided it is comrnitted to radical institutional changes. It also demonstrated the 
importance of achieving a public consensus around the national idea， which shall unite everybody in a synergetic effort 
to achieve certain goals. Being lirnited in natural resources， Japan has generated a specific modemization resource out 
of its institutional system. 
The second grand modemization in Japan took place World War 1. In both cases， the start-up point was when both 
the society and its govemment came to understand that the development at the cu町entrate and， which is more impor-
tant， inthe same mode is inappropriate. It was the understanding of the necessity to change the vector in order to 
change the pace of econornic development. lt was also the underst叩 dingthat these reforms would affect the fundamen-
tal institutions of society， prop巴rtyrights， techniques and methods of goveming and management and in certain sense， 
the ideology itself. In the Meiji period it was explained by the necessity to increase the rnilitaηpower of Japan in antic-
ipation of econornic and territorial rep釘titionof the world. On the contr訂y，in the second half of 1940s -early 1950s 
the country required dernilitarization. A substantial reduction in rnilitary spending coincided with an increase of social 
spending and the boost of the final goods production specifically intended for the mass market. 
Thus， inboth cases the modemization of Japan was preceded by fundamental shifts in ideology， politics姐 deconom-
ics. In order to modemize， it was necess紅Yto ensure a broad social base and support from al strata of the population. 
In this connection modemization was preceded by the democratization of Japanese society， which provided an addi-
tional institutional r巴sourceof the project. An institutional equilibrium when al agents for that or another do not con-
sider it profitable to spend resources on restructuring existing agreements， even if the later紅einefficient， was inten-
tionally violated171 • It opened the way for the immediate institutional changes and further to those changes that should 
retum the equi!ibrium at a new level. This sequence allowed to avoid the simulation of changes， a phenomenon known 
in the present Russian reality18) • 
During the Meiji period the ‘han system' was abolished， and feudals surrendered their hereditary authority to the 
central govemment， being re-appointed as nOIトhereditarygovemors of their former domains. The rights of peasants 
were ensured. Meiji oligarchy form巴dthe core of the capitalist development. To generate revenue and to develop a 
sound infrastructure， the new govemment financed harbor improvements， lighthouses， machinery imports， schools etc. 
The liberalization of entrepreneurship was followed with the flush in public life. 
Sirnilar phenomena occurred after World War 1 when the ‘econornic rniracle' of Japan was also preceded by a 
substantial economical liberalization and political democratization. The occupational adrninistration had successfully 
(if not entirely) abolished many of the financial coalitions (Zaibatsu)， which had previously monopolized industry. 
lt should be noted that the democratization of the Japanese society was only initiated by the Americans， but was 
implemented by the Japanese themselves who apparently demamd巴dit. Although de jure the postwar econornic reforms 
have been imposed upon Jap阻， de facto they found themselves profitable for the country. Thus a specific institutional 
source of the rapid modemization of Japan included an interconnected combination of intemal institutional factors with 
an extemal influence. It increased the social opportunities of the nation， reduced transaction costs and provided the 
basis for the further rapid econornic growth19) • 
Being effective for Japan as a whole， itspostwar reforms w巴repainful enough for the privi!eged classes， since the 
property relations were affected. These reforms underrnined the interests of many of wealthy and influential Jap祖 ese
who obviously stood to lose a great deal. Alongside with the bureaucratic resist叩 ce，and the opportunistic behavior of 
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responsible officials it could not but hamper the implementation of these institutional changes. Thus the outcome of 
these problems depended upon the balance of the dominant economic interests and the political will of ruling elites. 
In Japan， this problem was eased by the presence of the institution of Emperor and its power. Appeal to the 
Emperor' s charisma sometimes allowed to break the resistance of th巴mostinfluential samurai classes in白eMeiji peri-
od as well as to suppress militarist wing of the govemment in 1945. It should be noted that the Institute of Emperor' s 
power， being an inviolable basis of the Japanese society， did not remain immutable through the time. It has been chang-
ing through al the tim巴inaccordance with the desired circumstances and what is more，“… a qualitative leap forward 
was achieved on the basis of updating traditions， rather than their deniaJ20l." The modemization of the coun町 began
at the higher levels of govemance， which sent strong signals to the lower levels of govemance and to the society as a 
whole. We may remind the return of Emperor M吋ito the capital in 1868， and the historical address of Emperor 
Hirohito to the nation in 1946. Thus the state impact is cari巴dthrough not only the layer of formal rules， but also 
through the layer of public sense. I.Inxter calls this process a cultural engineering:“when the state initiates changes of 
traditions and cultural values in order to reduce the financial and political costs of modemization21人"
To sum up with the modemization pattems of Japan in the late 19 th century and in the mid 20 th centuη，we may 
point put two features. First， modemizations were initiated when the society recognized that the previous developm巴nt
pattem became inappropriate for the fuωre practice. Second， modemizations were preceded with the transformation of 
govemment institutions， liberalization of economy and democratization of society， de-monopolization and development 
of entrepreneurial activity with a special support for small and medium-sized businesses， farms巴tc.It released the ener-
gy of society for implementation of new historical tasks. Creating of new institutions， introduction of new principles of 
work， rationalization of methods， on a new effective motivation grounds resulted in increas巴ofproductivity and efi-
ciency. It became an additional source of innovation that allowed to make a breakthrough， tosolve the urgent issues 
within the new technological and institutional framework. 
Today there is no universal approach to the construction of modemization pattems of na-tional economies. One of 
them is remarkable due to its promulgation in血eEuropean commu-nity， where it is related to with the policy of巴co-
nomic nationalism， orNeo-Colbertism. An-other one， which is more inherent to the Asian countries， focuses on the 
Japanese model. Although the situation in Russia is to a certain extent unique and requires a specific approach， deter-
mining its own modemization pattem must consider the experience of modemizations which already taken place. 
During the last one-and-a-half centuries in Russia modemizations occurred at least three times. The first one took 
place after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and has been associated with the emergence of capitalism in Russia. The 
second took place in 1920-30s and was associated with the necessity to recover from World War 1 and Civil war losses， 
which gradually tumed to the industrialization projects. The third began in early 1990s and the task was to re-introduce 
capitalism upon the basis of a centralized planned economy which was gradually dismantled. 
In common features， the pattems of these upgrades seem to be similar to the Japanese pattems. All of these modem-
izations were preceded by a deep economic crisis， a prolonged stagnation of economy and an urgent appeal from socie-
ty towards upgrading. As a rule， democratization and liberalization were also use， toa certain extent， asa specific con-
ducive factor. In Russia of the late 19 centuηthat was the liberation of the peasants from serfdom; in the USSR of 
1920-30s it was the idea of a state of workers and peasants free from capitalist exploitation， which at least formally 
expanded their economic rights and social security. As soon as certain modemization resources were exhausted they 
were replaced with others， also aimed at ensuring economic growth22) • Japan of the first half of 20 century was pursu-
ing an aggressive foreign policy seeking for new territories and reparations inflow from the defeat巴dcountries. In 
1920s the USSR abandoned the trotzkist ideas of the world revolution in favour of selected participation in geopolitical 
conflicts on the general background of increase of its defense capabilities in the face of the‘threat of capitalism' . But 
al of this， both in Japan and in the USSR has largely compromised the very idea of modemization and resulted in sharp 
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social and economic conflicts， which forced first to change the v巴ctorof policy and next， torol some of reforms back. 
When the institutional changes go against acc巴ptedstandards， their implementation and maintenance become costly. 
As a result， the emergence of a new economic institution may entail an unforeseen increase of transaction costs that 
would nullify the effect of its introduction. Ryazanov notes that“introduction of the institution will be effective only if 
the increase in transaction costs will be offset by profit growth or decline in the total (production and transaction) 
costs231". We may assume as a basic criteria of the necessity of institutional changes that they must serve as a factor of 
growth， and not th巴brake.In this context， the succ巴sof Japanese modernization after WWII is determined by the fact 
“they were not burdened with high transaction costs， thus showing themselves virulent in the specific institutional con-
ditions in the long run241"， rather than the mere innovations and their mass scale implementation. Thus， returning to the 
issue of Russian modernization pattern for today， we must insist that its social eligibility should be coupled with a 
reduction of transaction costs， which is not too easy in the cu汀entsituation. 
Recent global crisis has revealed in Russia an alarming trend to slow down the pace of modernization. Certain sec・
tors of the economy have shown even regressive changes: increased monopolization， decreased agricultural productivi-
ty， increased bureaucratization of the economy etc.251 • At the same time no institutional changes were undertaken 
although necessity of them has been steadily increasing. Besides other drawbacks， the attractiveness of the investment 
climate decreased. All that constituted the necessity ty search for the n巴wermodernization pa日erns.
The new modernization project for Russia must be evaluated in terms: is it the further development of recent market 
reforms， or the r巴-accelarionof th巴lostpace within the old model， orthis is a radical change of the previously selected 
pattern. These evaluations bring us to the conclusion that this is not a roll-back of the previous reform. Rather， this is an 
attempt to make some fundamental changes pursuing the goal to upgrade to a higher level of technological， social and 
economic development. It is apparent that success on this way may be achieved only upon understanding that to suc-
ceed one shal1 critically estimate the present state of things， understanding that the cu町四tpace is inappropriate， and to 
define strictly the resource set to be used in this project. The peculiarity and complexity of the situation is that we 
observe attempts to combin巴thetwo processes， first， toextend the previously reform pattern and， second， togive it a 
new impetus and a new vector. It should be recogniz巴dthat the negative effects of the previous patter as bureaucracy 
and co汀uptionhas not yet been overcome， and出ewhole resource set to be applied in the future model has not been 
clearly defied. 
Drawing on the experience of countries which have already passed through moderniza-tions， we may pick out certain 
conditions that should be met to provide success. The most im-portant of them are: a clear ideological framework that 
shall unite the soci巴ty，relevant changes in formal and informal governanc巴rules，with the subsequent institutional shift， 
and ・culturalengine巴ring'and other specific resources of suppo此formodernization project. Probably some qualita-
tive estimates may be useful here to evaluate the performance during the active phase. In pぽticular，it is necessary to 
identify and to prevent a悦emptsto simulate r巴formswith publicized impressive campaigns， which may lead to waste， 
and even to a loss of resources without the relevant economic and social return， ordisorientate the planned vector of the 
entire pattern. 
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